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ROCHIN AND BREITHAUPT IN CONTEXT*
JAMES R. RICHARDSON**
PRELIVINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Modern scientific methods of fact-finding present evidentiary prob-
lems of admissibility which are grounded in reliability of the process,
validity of the technique employed and desired policy objectives. In
the final analysis, these three facets of the problem are all indivisibly
interrelated since, in order to determine acceptable policy, scientific
process and application of that process must inevitably be considered
in the light of the concept of due process even though due process as
such may not be posed affirmatively in any particular decision.' More-
over, it must be recognized that these factors will be present in vary-
ig degrees of intensity, dependent upon the facts and circumstances
of a given situation.
As to reliability of a scientific process, test or experiment, the propo-
sition here advanced is that if the particular process, such as a lie
detector test or a test to determine intoxication, is so unreliable as to
have little or no probative value, the admission on behalf of the state
of the results thereof in a criminal prosecution would violate due
process; the same material could likewise be excluded by invoking the
rule of immateriality. On the other hand, if the results of such tests
are of probative value and favorable to the defendant, exclusion would
violate due process; even though the reviewing court could confine
its consideration to rules of evidence and find prejudicial error on the
part of the trial court in excluding evidence material to the issues.
2
* The problems of self-incrimination and due process of law raised herein
are discussed in greater detail in the author's book Modern Scientific Evi-
dence.
** Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; author, Kentucky Practice
Methods (1957); Establishing a Law Practice (1958).
1. Rules of evidence may, in certain instances, be rightly condemned as
rigid and arbitrary, but, nevertheless, they represent policy concepts where
questions of admissibility are presented, since the balancing of conflicting
interests through the admission-exclusion process is calculated to control the
outcome of decisions properly. As to the statement that the procedure always
involves due process of law, if material and competent matter is excluded,
or prejudicial matter is admitted in evidence, the broad catch-all concept of
due process could be invoked if another existing rule or doctrine were not
available. That is to say, if the fourth and fifth amendments to the federal
constitution were non-existent, an enlightened, policy-conscious court would
exclude evidence which it judicially conceived to have been wrongfully-
obtained, or viewed as self-incriminating, under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
2. We are'not directly concerned in this article with judicial standards for
determining reliability of a particular process as a criterion for admissibility.
However, it is quite clear that the widely cited test of "general scientific
acceptance" laid down in Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
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As to the validity of the technique employed, this phase of the
problem can be viewed as being double-barrelled in nature. That is,
"validity" may refer to the scientific validity of the technique utilized
in conducting a test and may be assessed by looking to the qualifica-
tions of the expert and the observance of proper control procedures
by such expert.3 On the other hand, the reference may be to the
constitutional validity of the technique employed, which can be
judged in'regard to the person subjected to the test and the manner
in which his participation is secured.4 This participation may be
voluntary or involuntary, and it is the purpose of this article to inves-
tigate the issues raised thereby, in the light of society's objectives
under existing rules of evidence and relevant constitutional safe-
guards.
THE Rochin CASE
An admirable vehicle for posing the problem on admissibility of
factual evidence, secured by the proper or improper use of modern
fact finding techniques, is found in the much discussed Rochin case.5
On the facts, this case presents a summary and effective means of
securing incriminating evidence against a recalcitrant suspect. How-
1923), is properly the basis for according judicial notice to a scientific device
or procedure; and that, as stated by Wigmore, "all that should be required as
a condition (to admissibility) is the preliminary testimony of a scientist that
the proposed test is an accepted one in his profession and that it has a
reasonable measure of precision in its indications." 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 990
(2d ed. 1923). McCormick rejects the "general scientific acceptance" test as
criterion for admissibility in supporting acceptance by "a substantial body of
scientific opinion" as a standard for admissibility. McCoRMicx, EVIDENCE § 174
(1954).
3. Conceivably, the skill and training of an expert who has basic qualifica-
tions may govern the issues of weight and conclusiveness rather than that of
admissibility, and the same is true with respect to control procedures em-
ployed in some instances. For instance, in State v. Damoorgian, 53 N.J. Super.
108, 146 A.2d 550 (1959), the defendant argued that results of an intoxication
test were not admissible against him since three essential elements of the test
were not shown to have been complied with. The reviewing court, in holding
the results admissible, stated that it had no particular argument with cases
so holding, but went on to observe that whether these three essential elements
have been complied with fully goes to weight, not admissibility. The court
was also of the opinion that it is not necessary for the operator of a drunk-
ometer or the person who prepares the chemical compounds to be a college
graduate with a B.S. in chemistry, since one can acquire the required skills
through training and experience.
4. In People v. Heirens, 122 N.E.2d 231, 4 Ill.2d 131 (1954), it was contended,
and not seriously controverted, that the police unlawfully searched the de-
fendant's living quarters and seized stolen property found there; that he was
subjected to prolonged and continuous questioning; that, while in the hospital
recovering from a serious beating he suffered in the process of resisting arrest,
he was compelled to submit to lie detector tests; and that he was also given
injections of sodium pentothol without his consent. This is an extreme case
on the facts but it will illustrate the problem presented by the misuse of
modern fact-finding techniques.
5. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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ever, the evidentiary and constitutional issues thereby created can-
not be disposed of in so cursory a manner.
In the Rochin case, three deputy sheriffs, "having some information
that the defendant was selling narcotics," entered his home early one
morning without a search warrant and proceeded to a bedroom on the
second floor where they forced open the door. Rochin, only partially
dressed, was seated on the side of the bed. Almost immediately he
seized two capsules from a night stand beside the bed and swallowed
them. He was handcuffed and rushed to a hospital where, at the
direction of one of the officers, a doctor forced an emetic solution
through a tube into Rochin's stomach. This "stomach pumping" pro-
duced the capsules which were shown to contain morphine, and which
constituted the chief evidence against the defendant in a prosecution
that resulted in his conviction on the charge of possessing "a prepara-
tion of morphine" in violation of the California Health and Safety
Code. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the
ground that a serious question was raised as to the limitations which
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes on the
conduct of criminal proceedings by the states.6
In the majority opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it
was held that the police methods employed in securing incriminating
evidence against the petitioner did more than merely offend some
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating
crime too energetically. Rather, as seen by the majority, the conduct
displayed toward the petitioner was so brutal as to approach the
techniques of the rack and the screw; and hence, the conviction was
reversed as offensive to the due process clause, a constitutional guar-
antee "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental."
Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, would have reversed on
other grounds. He stated that: "What the majority hold is that the
Due Process Clause empowers this Court to nullify any state law if its
application 'shocks the conscience,' offends a 'sense of justice' or runs
counter to the decencies of civilized conduct." Justice Black's chief
6. Rochin was tried before a California superior court, sitting without a
jury. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari from affirmance by the
state district court of appeals, People v. Rochin, 101 Cal. App. 2d 140, 225
P.2d 1 (1951), and denial of review by the state supreme court, 101 Cal.
App. 2d 143, 225 P.2d 913, (1951). Two justices dissented from this view stating
in part: "Had the evidence forced from the defendant's lips consisted of an
oral confession that he illegally possessed a drug . . . he would have the
protection of the rule of law which excludes coerced confessions from evi-
dence. But because the evidence forced from his lips consisted of real objects
the People of this state are permitted to base a conviction upon it. I find 'no
valid ground of distinction between a verbal confession extracted by physical
abuse and a confession wrested from defendant's body by physical abuse."
225 P.2d at 917-18.
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objection to the majority decision was that it set a nebulous, evanes-
cent standard which could be used to destroy the Bill of Rights and
individual liberty. The Justice was further of the opinion that a
person is compelled to be a witness against himself not only when he
is compelled to testify orally, but also when, as in the instant case,
incriminating evidence is forcibly taken from him by a contrivance of
modern science.7 Likewise, Mr. Justice Douglas in concurring in the
result, i.e., reversal, but not the reasons therefor, expressed the view
that words taken from the lips, capsules taken from the stomach, or
blood taken from the veins are all inadmissible provided they are
taken without the subject's consent, since such procedures contravene
the fifth amendment.8
In summary, the majority concluded that due process of law cannot
be frozen at some fixed stage of time or thought; that due process of
law cannot be heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and
credible evidence is obtained; that due process of law as a historic
and generative principle precludes convictions that are brought about
by methods which "offend a sense of justice"; and that, admittedly,
hypothetical situations can be conjured up, shading imperceptibly
from the circumstances of the instant case and by gradations produc-
ing practical differences despite seemingly logical extensions.
It is true that to define a term or concept restricts it, and restriction
may destroy its utility. On the other hand, this expressed accordion-
like philosophy prohibits the application of known standards, and,
while we must avoid the danger of requiring courts to function as
inaminate machines, there would be equal danger in allowing judges
to run at large in the constitutional adjudication process. From the
opinion, one receives the distinct impression that the Court was
acutely aware of the tightrope it was walking, and one of the grada-
tions of which it spoke was provided by the Breithaupt case. That
the Court, in Rochin, anticipated necessary action in this area in the
near future is apparent from its words:
In deciding this case we do not heedlessly bring into question decisions
in many states dealing with essentially different, even if related, prob-
7. This is, of course an expression of the minority view on what constitutes
self-incrimination. See McCoRICK, EVIDENCE § 126 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore does not limit the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination to testimonial utterances. The protection to the
individual is "from any disclosure sought by legal process against him as a
witness." Hence, he includes within the orbit of the privilege "the production
of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary or party-witness)
in response to a subpoena."
8. There is much to be said for Justice Douglas' argument that it is unjust to
free the state courts from the command of the fifth amendment and then
nullify a definite rule of evidence by excoriating them for flouting "the
decencies of civilized conduct" when they admit the evidence.
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lems. We therefore put to one side cases which have arisen in the state
courts through use of modern methods and devices for discovering wrong-
doers and bringing them to book. It does not fairly represent these deci-
sions to suggest that they legalize force so brutal and so offensive to
human dignity in securing evidence from a suspect as is revealed by
this record.9
Thus, the stage was set for Breithaupt, and cases of a similar nature,
in which the Court would be required to examine methods employed
to secure incriminating evidence from the subject in the light of the
vague contours of the due process clause.
THE Breithaupt CASE
In Breithaupt, the petitioner was the driver of a pickup truck which
collided with a passenger car, killing three occupants of that vehicle.'0
lie was taken to a hospital and while lying unconscious in an emer-
gency room the smell of liquor was detected on his breath. At the
request of a highway patrolman, who had discovered an almost empty
bottle of whiskey in the wrecked truck, an interne withdrew a sample
of about 20 cubic centimeters of the petitioner's blood by use of a
hypodermic needle. This sample was given to the patrolman and
subsequent laboratory analysis revealed the blood contained .17 per
cent alcohol by weight. Testimony regarding the blood test and its
result was admitted into evidence at trial over the petitioner's objec-
tion, along with expert opinion to the effect that a person with .17 per
cent alcohol in his blood is under the influence of intoxicating liquor."
The petitioner was convicted and sentenced for involuntary man-
slaughter. He did not appeal the conviction, but subsequently sought
release from imprisonment by petition for a writ of habeas corpus to
the Supreme Court of New Mexico.'2 The court, after argument,
9. 342 U.S. at 174.
10. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
11. The National Safety Council and the American Medical Association
have made certain findings and recommendations which have been incorpo-
rated into statutes in many states. They are in brief: (1) Less than 0.05%
alcohol in the blood of a subject leads to a presumption of non-intoxication.
(2) Where there is 0.15% or more alcohol in the blood there is a presumption
of intoxication. (3) Where there is between .05% and .15% alcohol in the
blood, no presumption arises but the evidence is receivable as bearing on the
issue of intoxication. The foregoing figures are footnoted pictorially in
Lawrence v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. App. 2d 6, 127 P.2d 931 (1942). They
are also, referred to in Toms v. State, 239 P.2d 812 (Okla. 1952). See an
authoritative article, Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 34 Ky. L.J. 250
(1946).
12. Petitioner sought and was denied a writ of habeas corpus from the Dis-
trict Court for Santa Fe County, New Mexico, on March 7, 1952. Affirmed,
Breithaupt v. Abram, 58 N.M. 385, 271 P.2d 827 (1954). The Supreme Court of
New Mexico was of the opinion that the issue of denial of due process of law
could properly be raised by writ of habeas corpus after the time for an appeal
had expired, but held that the admission, in an involuntary manslaughter
prosecution, of evidence based on the results of a blood test made of a blood
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denied the writ, whereupon, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to determine whether the requirements of the due
process clause, as it concerns state criminal proceedings, necessitated
the invalidation of the conviction.
13
The Court began by observing:
It has been clear since Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 . . . that
evidence obtained in violation of rights protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution must be excluded in federal criminal
prosecutions. There is argument on behalf of petitioner that the evidence
used here, the result of the blood test, was obtained in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that the taking
was the result of an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Likewise, he argues that by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment there has been a violation of the Fifth Amendment in that
introduction of the test result compelled him to be a witness against
himself. Petitioner relies on the proposition that "the generative princi-
ples" of the Bill of Rights should extend the protections of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments to his case through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But Wolf v. Colorado... answers this contention
in the negative.14
Next, the Court came to the heart of the real issue presented by
stating, "the petitioner's remaining and primary assault on his con-
viction is not so easily unhorsed." This primary assault was the
argument that the conduct of the state officers in taking Breithaupt's
blood without his consent offended that "sense of justice" of which
the Court spoke in Rochin. But, the Supreme Court rejected this final
and basic contention of the petitioner, seeing as the real distinction
from Rochin the fact that there is nothing brutal or offensive, so as
to not comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency, in tak-
ing blood from an unconscious person when done, as in this case,
under the protective eye of a physician; and "the absence of conscious
consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a viola-
tion of a constitutional right."'
15
sample taken from the accused while he was unconscious was not a denial
of due process, since the rule against compulsory or involuntary testimony
from a defendant does not apply to real evidence so secured.
13. Breithaupt v. Abram, 351 U.S. 906 (1956).
14. 352 U.S. at 434. The reference of the Court to the Wolf decision is to
this reasoning: "The notion that 'the due process of law' guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment is shorthand for the first eight amendments of the
Constitution and thereby incorporates them has been rejected by this Court
again and again, after impressive consideration." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 26 (1949). In support of the New Mexico Supreme Court decision, it
should be noted that that state has rejected, as it may, the exclusionary rule
set forth in Weeks. State v. Dillon, 34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929).
(1929).
15. 352 U.S. at 435-36. See also nn.2,3 on those pages. Carrying on a step
beyond statutes which make Secretaries of State process agents for service
on non-resident motorists, it is arguable that a driver on the highways, in
obedience to state policy, would consent to have a blood test made as a part
[ VOL. 14
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To buttress the view that the taking of blood from an unconscious
person is not such "conduct that shocks the conscience," the majority
opinion stated that this standard refers not to the conscience of a
sensitive person, but rather to the sense of decency and fairness of
the whole community, and does not condone blood taking under indis-
criminate conditions which would be within the "brutality" of the
Rochin case. To bolster its position the majority pointed out that
blood tests are routine procedure upon entering the army, making
application for marriage licenses, entering college, and for blood
donors and the like, concluding that a blood test taken by a skilled
technician is not such a method of obtaining evidence as to constitute
a violation of due process within Rochin.
The dissent, written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and joined in by
Justices Black and Douglas, expressed the view that the decision
expunges all meaning and validity from Rochin and causes it to stand
for no more than personal revulsion against particular police methods.
The dissent sees Rochin and Breithaupt as basically the same on the
facts, with public interest, that is the interest in forestalling dope
peddling and slaughter on the highways, equally present in both
instances. Then, the dissent observes that the majority opinion fails
to distinguish between the two essential parts of the problem: (1) the
nature of the invasion of the person; and (2) the expression of the
victim's will. According to the dissenting Justices, if there is no
affirmative consent it is all the same if (1) the victim states unequivo-
cally that he objects, (2) resists violently, or (3) is unable to protest;
in any event consent is lacking and any distinction is invalid.
DISTiNGUISHInG Rochin AND Breithaupt
The facts of Rochin and Breithaupt have been set out in detail
because of significant analogies that may be drawn and due to the
fact that they are undeniably landmark cases in the restricted area
of scientific evidence which they encompass. The similarity of the
material facts in these two cases are patent. They are:
1. Evidence was secured from the bodies of suspects by means of
technical processes or devices.
2. In both instances the methods were common, medically accepted
techniques.
of a sensible and civilized system protecting himself as well as other citizens
not only from the hazards of the road due to drunken driving, but also from
the use of dubious lay testimony on his state of sobriety. However, this
fictional consent would be the crux of such assumption. And, of the forty-
seven states authorizing chemical tests to determine intoxication in traffic
accidents, none sanction involuntary tests, as such, though there are sanctions
for refusal, such as suspension of driver's license or comment on trial by the
prosecutor.
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3. Consent for the taking was lacking in both situations.
4. The evidence secured by scientific procedure was in each case
materially significant in securing convictions on serious felony
counts.
5. Policy considerations were present in each case since the alleged
infractions and police methods were weighted with public inter-
est.
The notable points of dissimilarity are:
1. In Rochin the accused violently resisted the taking of evidence,
while in Breithaupt he was unconscious and unable to resist.
2. In Rochin a foreign, contraband substance was removed from the
body of the accused, while in Breithaupt the accused's own blood
was taken. This distinction was not considered by the court.
3. Rochin was taken forcibly from his own bedroom, apparently
without a warrant whereas Breithaupt was taken from a public
highway by ambulance to a hospital. However, this is not a
factor which was of any apparent consequence in the decisions.
From the above analysis, it is apparent that there was an invasion
of the person without consent in both cases. Moreover, if the taking of
blood by means of a hypodermic needle is a medically accepted proce-
dure, it is equally true that the use of a stomach pump is a common
and medically accepted means of making tests, relieving distress and
saving lives. Thus it is inescapably clear that the majority opinions in
Rochin and Breithaupt use physical resistance and consequent appli-
cation of force as the real point of differentiation, and the discussion
on the salutary results of blood tests is engaged in only for its buttress-
ing effect.
If, as must be conceded, brutality of method is the controlling factor
in the cases, then Rochin and Breithaupt can be distinguished and
reconciled, not by referring to any set standard but only by viewing
the limits of permissible investigative techniques as a matter of degree
to be determined in individual cases. But, if overzealous action of
police officers is used as the criterion for determining if due process
has been violated in such cases, does this not obscure that which
should be the real issue, namely, violation of security of the person
without consent? To place a premium on the ability of a suspect to
resist permits the state to make fortune out of misfortune where one
is unable to resist. Had the officers knocked Breithaupt unconscious
and had a blood sample taken, the case would have been within
Rochin, according to the implications of Breithaupt. However, is it not
fundamentally the same if you find a man unconscious, give him a
ROCHIN AND BREITHAUPT
pill to put him to sleep, or blackjack him into insensibility? In any
of these situations, consent to invasion of his person is lacking and
use of evidence so obtained should be barred under rule of evidence
or constitutional right.16
STATE DECISIONS COMPARED
It is of practical interest to note how some of the states have treated
the admissibility of involuntary test results; and the intriguing two
fact situations of Texas cases invite comparison with Rochin and
Breithaupt. In the first of these, Ash v. State,"' the defendant was
convicted on a charge of receiving and concealing stolen property,
which consisted of two diamond rings. When apprehended, the defend-
ant was observed by the arresting officers to swallow objects, appar-
ently metallic, which they believed to be the rings in question. He
was taken forcibly to a hospital and by means of a fluoroscope the
rings were located in the lower part of his intestines. Next, the defend-
ant was subjected to an enema, against his will, which resulted in
elimination and recovery of the stolen rings. The defendant appealed
on the grounds that he had been denied due process of law and forced
to incriminate himself. The reviewing court dismissed these argu-
ments by stating that the arrest and search were legal since possession
of the rings and secreting them in the presence of the officers consti-
tuted a felony committed in their presence; that the fluoroscopic and
purging processes were conducted by experts; that there was no
evidence of cruel or inhuman methods to recover the rings; that the
enema was a natural and normal way to recover stolen property
secreted in an unusual manner and that the only force used was to
combat the physical resistance of the defendant.
In the other Texas case involving the issue of "consent," Apodaca
v. State,18 the defendant was convicted of manslaughter through
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Upon appeal, the
defendant complained that he had been compelled to furnish a speci-
men of urine for analysis of alcoholic content, make right turns, touch
his finger to his nose and walk a straight line, such constituting self-
incrimination in that he was required to give evidence against himself.
16. Perhaps three out of four states which have considered the problem
have held that the result of a blood test taken from an unconscious person is
admissible in evidence. People v. Duroncelay, 146 Cal. App. 2d 96, 303 P.2d
617 (1956); Block v. People, 125 Colo. 36, 240 P.2d 512 (1951); State v. Ayres,
70 Idaho 18, 211 P.2d 142 (1949); State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283
(1945). See also State v. Sturtevant, 96 N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); cf. United
States v. Williamson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954). But see State
v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1950); State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266,
79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
17. Ash v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. 420, 141 S.W.2d 341 (1940).
18. Apodaca v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940).
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The reviewing court was of the expressed opinion that the essence of
the privilege against self-incrimination is "compulsion"; that the
defendant, compelled to do the things required of him by the officers,
had been forced to give evidence against himself; and that, hence,
the privilege against self-incrimination was violated.19
One writer, in commenting on this decision, observes that nowhere
in the opinion was reference made to the Ash case decided by the same
court only one year previously, and that in so far as the self-incrimina-
tion privilege is concerned there is no distinction between the com-
pulsory removal of a ring from the intestines and the compulsory
procurement of a specimen of urine.20 In the abstract, this observation
is doubtlessly true both as to constitutional as well as aesthetic con-
siderations. But this able critic ignores the fact that in Ash the court
emphasized enforced passivity, while in Apodaca emphasis was defi-
nitely on enforced activity through being "compelled to do things."
It was this compulsion to act which permitted the court to find self-
incrimination under the Texas rule. This is not to say that this
minority view on what constitutes self-incrimination is sound, but
to demonstrate that the Texas court could reach this decision logically
enough without attempting to distinguish Apodaca from Ash.
In the Texas cases and the federal decisions by way of comparison,
we have use of an emetic as contrasted with an enema, and involun-
tary blood taking as contrasted with compulsion to provide a speci-
men of urine and do other affirmative acts. Perhaps the Texas judges
had stronger stomachs in endorsing the use of an enema than did
the majority of the Supreme Court in decrying the use of an emetic,
despite the fact that Justice Douglas, in a contempt of court case,
stated that judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive
in a hardy climate.21 Be that as it may, Ash and Rochin can be dis-
tinguished on one significant point. In the latter the emetic was used
solely to secure incriminating evidence, while in the former the enema
had as an additional objective the recovery of valuable stolen prop-
erty. So, perhaps the end justified the means on the basis of expedi-
ency if nothing else. As for the results in Apodaca and Breithaupt, the
Supreme Court, in view of the rule it follows, would not have found
a violation of the constitutional privilege, as did the Texas court, and
it is logical to assume that it would not have found a violation of due
19. It is the general rule that the privilege against self-incrimination pro-
tects against testimonial compulsion either before or at trial, through speech
or the equivalent of speech. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE, § 126 (1954); 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2263 (3d ed. 1940). But some jurisdictions in interpreting the privi-
lege draw a distinction between enforced passivity and enforced activity on
the part of the accused. This doctrine is well illustrated by State v. Griffin,
129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924).
20. INBAU, SELF-INcR1IMINATION 73 (1950).
21. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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process, on the ground that the compulsion employed was not such
as to "shock the conscience and approach the rack and the screw."
A sensationally publicized state decision involving, among other
things, illegal search and seizure, involuntary narcoanalysis and
forced polygraph examinations is worthy of discussion in connection
with Breithaupt and Rochin.2 In this case, William Heirens, a college
student seventeen years of age, pleaded guilty to three murder indict-
ments and twenty-six additional indictments charging various rob-
beries, burglaries and assaults. He was sentenced to the penitentiary
for life on each of the murder indictments, the sentences to run con-
secutively, and the statutory penalties on the other indictments were
imposed to run concurrently with each other, but consecutively to
the sentences on the murder indictments. Approximately six years
later Heirens filed a petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act of
Illinois, alleging that his constitutional rights had been violated in a
number of respects. The State filed an answer, a hearing was held
after which judgment was entered denying the petition; thereupon
Heirens sought and was granted a review on writ of error to the
Supreme Court of Illinois.
The decision, which affirms the action of the trial court in both
instances, reveals investigative procedures as bizarre as the facts of
the petitioner's numerous crimes. It was contended and not seriously
controverted: that the police forcibly entered and unlawfully searched
Heirens' living quarters and seized stolen property found therein; that
he was subjected to prolonged and continuous questioning by law
enforcement officers; that, while he was confined in a hospital as the
result of a serious beating when he resisted arrest, he was injected
against his consent with sodium pentothol by doctors who were then
able to obtain admissions and confessions from him; that he was com-
pelled to submit to lie-detector tests; that adverse newspaper publicity
would have prevented him from having a fair and impartial trial;
that he was subjected to insistent urging of counsel and his parents
to plead guilty; that his attorneys, instead of giving him their undi-
vided allegiance, conceived it their duty to avoid any action which
might result in his return to society; and that his pleas of guilty were
not products of free and voluntary choice but were induced or com-
pelled by the illegally obtained evidence, the disclosures while under
22. People v. Heirens, 122 N.E.2d 231 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947
(1955). This case is discussed in Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced
Statements, 14 U. Cm. L. Rmv. 601 (1947); and in Muehlberger, Interrogation
under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRmv. L., C. & P.S. 513, 526 (1951). The psychiatric
report is reproduced in 38 J. CRmu. L., C. & P.S. 311 (1947). See Dession,
Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal In-
vestigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315 (1953) on the constitutional aspects of involun-
tary narcoanalysis and lie detector tests.
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the influence of drugs,23 the improbability of a fair trial in view of
adverse newspaper publicity and the extreme pressure exerted by
his parents and counsel.
In the face of this impressive list of alleged grievances, the review-
ing court conceded that the search of the defendant's living quarters
without a warrant, incessant and prolonged questioning of the defend-
ant while he was confined to a hospital bed, and the unauthorized use
of the truth serum and lie-detector were flagrant violations of his
rights; but the court stated that the pleas of guilty were not made
until more than a month after the occurrence of the acts complained
of by the petitioner; that the petitioner must be deemed to have been
aware, through his counsel, that any evidence obtained by unlawful
means could not be used against him; and that it was clear that the
antecedent conduct of the police and the state's attorney, however
much it was to be condemned, had no substantial connection with the
pleas of guilty.24
Passing from the conduct of the investigating officers to that which
may, in part at least, explain the defendant's conduct: There was
evidence that Ieirens was a "disassociated psychotic schizophrenic"-
a mental disease described by testimony of the experts as character-
ized by splitting of the personality, in which very frequently one
aspect of the personality may not be aware of the other and may not
be in communication with the other. From this evidence, the review-
ing court further conceded that the defendant's conduct, including
his involuntary disclosures under the drug, may have indicated that
the defendant was not legally sane, but stated that the mere fact
23. Heirens in effect confessed to the crimes while under the influence of
the "truth serum." He revealed the facts of the crimes in detail and attributed
their commission to an obstreperous friend named "George." "George" com-
pelled Heirens to locate suitable places to burglarize and carried out the
crimes over Heirens' strong protest. When Heirens was asked to describe
"George," he gave an accurate description of himself. In the lie detector test
-eirens was uncooperative and merely repeated the questions asked him by
the examiner.
24. When a confession has once been obtained, whether by force, threats,
exhaustive questioning, or involuntary narcoanalysis, the road is paved for
easy access to another in the future. The situation is explained in this
manner by Justice Jackson: "After an accused has once let the cat out of
the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter
free of the psychological and practical disadvantage of having confessed. He
can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a
sense, a later confession may always be looked upon as fruit of the first. But
this court has never gone so far as to hold that making a confession under
circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from
making a usable one after these conditions have been removed." United States
v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947). This was a federal prosecution for accept-
ing a bribe. The defendant army officer confessed while illegally detained.
Six months later, while no longer imprisoned but merely restricted to his
base he made a second confession. The Supreme Court held that the trial
court did not err in holding the second confession voluntary and admissible.
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that competent counsel did not advise their client to defend on such
ground did not show inadequate representation amounting to a denial
of due process. So, in this one last respect, the decision becomes as
bizarre as the facts in the case and the official investigating of those
facts.
One cannot but wonder why the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in view of Rochin. In any event, the Heirens case demonstrates how
insidious and devastatingly inquisitorial involuntary narcoanalysis
is, or can become, in laying bare the mind of a subject, as by a figura-
tive scalpel, thus causing him to reveal his innermost thoughts, hopes
and secrets.25 Involuntary narcoanalysis is, as to the examiner, unpro-
fessional and, as to the subject, a type of tyrannical oppression which
ignores all concepts of human dignity and ruthlessly invades the
security and privacy of the person in violation of due process of law,
and results in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination if
participation in crime is revealed.26
Chemical tests to determine intoxication constitute an area of scien-
tific investigation in which the opportunities for official abuse of
personal rights are legion, because of the usual absence of "consent"
to take the test. And, since the lack of consent to submit to an intoxi-
cation test cannot be projected as a defense on the basis of self-
incrimination as a general rule,27 the sole valid objection, if any, is
25. Heirens was responsive under the drug, but sodium pentothol, and re-
lated drugs, is not a truth serum and subjects so interviewed will not always
tell the truth. See Dession, Freedman, Donnelly, & Redlich, Drug-Induced
Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L.J. 315, 335 (1953), where it
is stated that if a state court admitted a confession made under narcoanalysis,
the Supreme Court would assuredly reverse a conviction as violative of due
process. Of course, Heirens pleaded guilty once the "cat was out of the bag"
due to involuntary narcoanalysis, so it was not necessary to use the tainted
confession.
26. Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. Cxr. L. REV.
601, 605 (1947); Matthews, Narcoanalysis for Criminal Interrogation, THE
JouRNAL-LANCET (n.s.) 283 (1950). Herein, techniques and results are de-
scribed by Dr. Matthews. See also People v. Esposito, 287 N.Y. 389, 39 N.E.2d
925 (1942). Here, in one of the rare reported decisions involving narcoanaly-
sis, the New York Court of Appeals approved the use of the "truth drugs"
metrazel and sodium amytal in a court-ordered psychiatric examination,
where the defense of insanity was interposed in a prosecution for murder.
The court rejected the defense's objection that testimony based on the drug
induced interview violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. This ruling is in harmony with the view that one cannot, in reason, set
up a particular defense, and then make his own rules for determining its
validity. This and similar objections, can be disposed of by holding them
inapplicable to proceedings to determine mental responsibility, not guilt or
innocence.
27. It is clear that in cases of involuntary tests for intoxication the defendant
does not provide testimonial utterances against himself, but, rather, he
furnishes real evidence against himself and under compulsion. State v. Cram,
176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283 (1945), is a decision vigorously upholding involun-
tary blood tests to determine intoxication. However, it is accompanied by an
equally vigorous dissent which state! .in part: "Will the injection of 'truth
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to be found in the guaranty of due process, if merited by the facts.
While it may be argued that consent is vitiated, in given cases, by
force or duress, psychological coercion, intoxication, or unconscious-
ness it should be noted that there are few reported decisions in which
actual force was used to secure body fluid samples. But, in one case
it was stipulated that police officers forcibly placed restraining straps
on the defendant and that his head was forcibly held steady during
the taking of a breath specimen.2s The issue presented was whether,
under these circumstances, the result of the drunkometer test, which
revealed a blood alcohol concentration of .24 per cent by weight was
admissible against the defendant. The reviewing court used an ingeni-
ous and convenient method of reasoning in order to uphold the trial
court in admitting the evidence.
The court stated that the stipulated facts did not disclose if breath
was forced from the defendant's lungs in some brutal manner or if
it was forced to be retained in the lungs and permitted to escape only
through some device clamped over the month or nostrils of the
defendant, or in some other inhuman or unlawful manner by the
use of force. In the absence of such stipulation the court assumed that
the obnoxious situation first described did not exist. The court then
observed that Arizona is committed to the rule that evidence secured
in violation of the fourth amendment does not preclude its admissi-
bility. Next, the court inquired whether forcibly taking a breath
specimen from a defendant for the purpose of a drunkometer test
violates article 2, section 10 of the Arizona constitution which provides
that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evi-
dence against himself.. . ." Strange as it may seem, the court said the
answer to its inquiry must be in the negative if the force is not used
in capturing the exhaled breath until after it leaves the body.
2 9
The court's final inquiry was in regard to illegal search and seizure,
serums,' or spinal punctures, or 'lie detectors' be the next step. I recognize
that law is a progressive science but 'progress' should not be accomplished by
an invasion of rights guaranteed under the constitution." 160 P.2d at 294.
28. State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259 P.2d 261 (1953). State v. Cash, 219 N.C.
818, 15 S.E.2d 277 (1941), and Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. 2d 752
(1944), did not involve actual force or duress but contain dicta frowning on
such tactics. See also People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198 P.2d 941
(1948). No hard and fast rule for duress or coercion that violates due process
can be laid down. Each case must go on its own merits. Vermont cases illus-
trate the problem. In State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097 (1901), taking
blood involuntarily was held to be a violation of constitutional rights. This
rule was reversed in State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 160 Atl. 257 (1932). Then in
State v. Pierce, 120 Vt. 373, 141 A.2d 419 (1959), the court said that the
broad rule of Stacy might have to be curtailed in future cases involving
violence and brutal conduct by policy officers.
29. In substantiation of this distinction, the court cited Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245 (1910), and 8 WiGmoRE, EvIENcE, § 2250 (3d ed. 1940) to the effect
that the privilege against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion
extracted from the person's own lips.
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and here the court applied its novel reasoning. That is, the defendant
-exhaled voluntarily in order to survive. The moment his breath
passed his lips it was no longer his to control, but became a part of
the surrounding atmosphere which was equally free for use by anyone
present within the orbit of its immediate circulation; the officers mak-
ing the arrest had the right of capture after it left his body. The
court went on to say that there was no invasion of the defendant's
person, and that so long as the officers limited their operation to the
capture of his breath after it left his body, by means which interferred
only slightly and temporarily with his freedom of action, he had no
legal right to obstruct their efforts. The court, it will be noted, gave
little or no attention to the fact that the defendant's breath was so
xeadily available for capture solely by reason of his complete and
forcible immobilization, as if in a strait jacket. Surely such police
procedure is plainly an illegal act, constituting an assault and battery
upon the person of the defendant, and evidence secured thereby
violates due process of law.
INVASION OF PRIVACY
It has been demonstrated that scientific methods of criminal investi-
gation provide great temptation for overzealous officers to make
unwarranted invasions of privacy and of the person in securing
incriminating evidence. Further, the suspect, if protection against
self-incrimination or illegal search and seizure is not available, may
be forced to rely on violation of due process of law. Unfortunately, his
person, privacy or property can be invaded with impunity under the
due process clause to a disturbing degree so long as official conduct
is not so outrageous as to shock the conscience.
To illustrate the above observation, another case involving a quite
different scientific method of investigation is revealing with regard
to the implications of Rochin and Breithaupt. In the case referred to
the state's conviction of the defendant for bookmaking rested upon
evidence obtained by officers through a series of intrusions on privacy
by methods described as "obnoxious" and "almost incredible" by the
reviewing court.30 The police strongly suspected the petitioner of
illegal bookmaking but were without proof -of it. In order to secure
this proof, an officer arranged to have a locksmith go to the home of
the petitioner when he and his wife were absent and make a copy of
the door key. Two days later, again in the absence of the occupants,
officers and a technician made entry into the home by the use of this
key and installed a concealed microphone in the hall. A hole was bored
in the roof of the house and wires were strung to transmit to a nearby
30. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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garage whatever sounds or conversation the microphone might pick
up. Officers were stationed in the garage to listen. A few days later
police officers again made a surreptitious entry and moved the micro-
phone, this time hiding it in the bedroom. Twenty days later, they
again made secret entry and placed the device in a closet, where it
remained until the purpose of enabling the officers to overhear incrimi-
nating statements was accomplished.
By a five to four decision of the Supreme Court, the petitioner's
attack on his conviction on the ground of violation of due process
failed. The facts were held to be outside the situation in Rochin and
within the purview of the Wolf case.31 Mr. Justice Jackson spoke as
follows for the majority:
However obnoxious are the facts in the case before us, they do not
involve coercion, violence or brutality to the person but rather a trespass
to property, plus eavesdropping.3 2
Regardless of whether Breithaupt is regarded as a refinement or as
a dilution of Rochin, it is not to be denied, that Irvine is a retreat from
the broader implications of Wolf wherein it was stated:
The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic in a free
society ....
Accordingly we have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirma-
tively to sanction such police intrusion into privacy it would run counter
to the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment.33
The concealed microphone does the job of the wire-tap and more,
since the privacy of one's home and family relations are laid bare to
public officials under facts as in Irvine. Yet, as to the wire tap, Justice
Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion, in the Olmstead case stated: "As
a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but
puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with
wire-tapping."1
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
From the discussion of the foregoing cases, it is apparent that the
issue of admissibility presented by illegally obtained evidence is
steeped in policy. The problem resolves itself into a clash between
31. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), holding that, in a prosecution in a
state court for a state crime, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable
search and seizure.
32. 347 U.S. at 133.
33. 338 U.S. at 27-28.
34. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1928), upholding by a five
to four decision the admissibility of evidence secured by wire-tapping in a
prosecution in Federal court for conspiracy to violate the Prohibition Act.
This decision led to enactment of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat.




public and private interests, and while the public interest must be
protected, it is equally true that the average defendant in a criminal
prosecution often needs protection from the almost unlimited investi-
gative resources of the state, in its utilization of scientific fact-finding
techniques.
This clash of strong interests has, as is to be expected, led to a
divergence of judicial thought. In support of the traditional view
which resolves the conflict in favor of admissibility, Justice Cardozo
has expressed his views as follows:
No doubt the protection of the statute would be greater from the point
of view of the individual whose privacy had been invaded if the govern-
ment were required to ignore what it had learned through the invasion.
The question is whether protection for the individual would not be
gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On the one
side is the social need that crime shall be repressed. On the other, the
social need that law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office. There
are dangers in any choice. The rule of the Adams case strikes a balance
between opposing interests. We must hold it to be the law until those
organs of government by which a change of public policy is normally
effected shall give notice to the courts that the change has come to pass.35
In another case, Justice Wheeler adhered to the same view with
even stronger language.
When evidence tending to prove guilt is before a court, the public interest
requires that it be admitted. It ought not to be excluded upon the theory
that individual rights under these constitutional guaranties are above the
right of the community to protection from crime. The complexities and
conveniences of modern life make increasingly difficult the detection of
crime. The burden ought not to be added to by giving to our constitu-
tional guaranties a construction at variance with that which has prevailed
for over a century at least. The cases in which in recent years some of
the courts have either excluded this class of evidence or ordered articles
taken from the accused returned to him have been in prosecutions for
violations of the laws against policy, gambling, fraud, and intoxicating
liquors. The next case may be one of murder, and the prosecutor be
compelled by the ruling of the court to return to the accused the certain
evidence of his guilt and the accused go free-his constitutional rights
against search protected above the right of society against his crime ....
If'the question recurs, where is the accused's remedy? The answer must
be by a civil action, the only form of remedy known for the protection
of an individual against a trespass. It may be that the officer would be
guilty of a contempt. If violations of these constitutional rights shall
multiply, undoubtedly the General Assembly can provide for a penalty
for subsequent violations. A penalty upon an officer for an illegal search
made without reasonable ground would furnish adequate protection
against such a public wrong.
3 6
35. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (1926). Admitting
incriminating evidence though secured by arresting officers through commis-
sion of a trespass in search of premises without a warrant.
36. State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 225, 125 A.2d 636, 639-40 (1924).
19611
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The contrary, and more logical view, favoring the rule of exclusion
has been commented on thusly by Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent
as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the
only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier
times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution,
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by
their wrong, will that wrong be repressed.37
Justice Vinson took a similar view in a decision involving these
conflicting views in writing:
The rights given by the IVth Amendment are sometimes quite distinct
from the determination of whether the defendant was driving under ther
influence of liquor. The two problems must be considered together,
however, in effectuating either the protection of the Constitution, or the
punishment of the guilty. When two interests conflict, one must prevail.
To us the interest of privacy safeguarded by the Amendment is more
important than punishing all th6se guilty of misdemeanors. Happy would
be the result if both interests could be completely protected. If this
declaration is admissible and justice meted out on the issue of drunken
driving, where is the defendant's remedy for the inexcusable entry into,
his home? The casuist answers-a civil action against the officers. That
remedy has been found wanting .... A simple effective way to assist in
the realization of the security guaranteed by the IVth Amendment, in this
type of case, is to dissolve the evidence that the officers obtained after
entering and remaining illegally in the defendant's home.38
To admit unlawfully obtained evidence against an accused is to
emasculate constitutional rights in many cases, and sanction laNT
enforcement by illegal means in all such cases.39 And to say that he.
has a remedy through a trespassory action is to turn one's back on
practicality. If by "remedy" is meant a positive deterrent to unlawful
search and seizure, then the remedy is illusory in effect. A wronged
37. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945).
38. Nusslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1940). In
substantiation of its statement that a civil action against officers has been
found wanting, the court cited Snyder v. United States, 285 Fed. 1, 3 (4th Cir.
1922). The court said: "We have been able to find among the reported
federal cases only one action for damages against an officer for an alleged
unreasonable search. Hunt v. Evans, 56 App. D.C. 97, 10 F.2d 892. There
was no recovery since the court held that the search warrant was good on its
face and the plaintiff invited the search. The number of cases in which the
courts have said that there was an unreasonable search and seizure negatives
any contention that actions for damages are not brought because the IV
Amendment is never infringed." 115 F.2d at 695 n.15.
39. As one able critic has observed the trend toward admission of illegally
obtained evidence is disappointing to one who feels that the Supreme Court's
control of lawless enforcement of the law by state officers has been a civilizing
influence. McCoRmvcK, EvnmNc. §§ 138-41 (1954). Dean McCormick notes
conflicting policy as demonstrated by state and federal decisions and hope-
fully observes that the tide seems to be turning against the traditional view
which admits evidence secured by unreasonable search and seizure.
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party may do no more than vindicate his rights by a verdict for
nominal damages only, since rarely would compensatory damages be
an element in the action. As for punitive damages, a case could rarely
be made out since the trespassing officer in determined pursuit of
crime will not generally entertain malice for the victim of an unlawful
search. As for due process, we have seen that its protection cannot be
invoked successfully unless (1) there is affirmative sanction by the
state of "incursions into privacy" of the individual, (2) or in case of
an involuntary verbal confession, (3) or in a situation where evidence
is secured through a process of force which is "brutal and offensive to
human dignity."
The employment of modern scientific processes to establish the guilt
or innocence of an accused person is worthy of commendation. How-
ever, when scientific devices are used to invade the privacy of one's
person or home without consent, with admissibility or inadmissibility
of the evidence thereby secured turning on the extent of brutality
employed, constitutional rights become ephemeral in substance due to
indeterminate standards for regulation of investigative methods. Cer-
tainly, the methods can be morally reprehensible and the results
viciously incriminating in many instances. We can only speculate as
to the future when narcoanalysis and lie detectors become more reli-
able and "scientifically acceptable." Even now the bare threat of their
use may lead to involuntary confessions which do not reflect "undue
influence." However, if scientific acceptance becomes a reality, will
the judiciary permit search of an accused's mind by means of a lie
detector or narcoanalysis, if the subject, for example, submits to an
examination through trickery or deception without employment of
methods which are "so brutal as to shock the conscience?" Demon-
strably, the answer, in the final analysis depends on a balancing of
values in relation to individual and public interests. Currently, the
Supreme Court, in view of Rochin, Breithaupt and Irvine, is com-
mitted to finding the answer in the extent to which brutality was
employed in the acquisition of incriminating evidence.
Viewed in the abstract, this middle of the road rule of policy for
interpreting and applying due process has some merit. But in practice
the countenancing of "little misconduct" and condemnation of "big
misconduct" is unsound since the necessary evidence is secured in
either instance. Moreover, the misconduct employed in criminal
investigation, if used at all, will usually be regulated by what the
authorities feel is necessary to secure the end result. Our three princi-
pal Supreme Court cases stand as witnesses for this statement.
Next, and finally, this middle of the road policy assumes that the
state and the accused deal at arm's length. Perhaps there was a time
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when this was true, and perhaps the accomplished criminal even held
the advantage over state enforcement agencies. But in this day of
modern scientific investigation the scale may well be weighted in
favor of the state, especially as to the average person accused of
crime.40 The state has almost unlimited resources for investigation
and laboratory tests of its findings, which are presented in a highly
partisan and adversary proceeding. How often, on the other hand,
can the average defendant hire investigators to uncover the facts,
undergo the costs of adequate pre-trial discovery, or pay for adequate
expert opinion? Crime detection is admittedly difficult and society
rightly uses all available scientific fact-finding methods in criminal
investigation and prosecution. But, while it has steadily strengthened
the prosecutor's office, society has done little or nothing to make its
scientific aids available to accused persons, and very little more in
the way of providing adequate counsel.41 Governmental responsibility
for the conduct of trials should extend to fact-finding on behalf of
defendants as well as the state, with court appointed experts available
to both parties, if true facts are to be revealed and constitutional
rights preserved.42 It may be that adversary presentation of conflict-
ing factual situations will eventually reach the truth in the majority
of cases, but meanwhile the tools of scientific investigation are con-
sistently used to invade the privacy of the person and home and the
accused finds himself virtually without redress unless the acts are so
carried out as to shock the conscience of the community.4
3
40. "A great many innocent persons have their privacy invaded or their
liberty curtailed in the course of police investigation. Constitutional and
legal rights of persons who have committed crimes are often ignored by the
police." George, Scientific Investigation and Defendants' Rights, 57 MIcH.
L. REV. 37 (1958). Of course, it may be argued that there is another side to
the coin; that clever criminals are quick to adopt scientific methods in the
planning and execution of crimes.
41. Mars, The Problem of the Indigent Accused, 45 A.B.A.J. 272 (1959).
42. "The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the
psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed
thoughts, beliefs and emotions. 'That places the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer was said by James Otis of much lesser intru-
sions than these. To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed 'subversive
of all the comforts of society.' Can it be that the Constitution affords no
protection against such invasions of individual security?" Brandeis, J., in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
43. "More subtle in method than the third degree and correspondingly more
difficult to restrict without impairing the efficacy of police activity is the prac-
tice of subjecting suspects to unpleasant scientific investigations prior to a
judicial determination of guilt. The zeal of the police, coupled with popular
superstition as to the infallibility of science makes it questionable whether
the law's protection of the individual's interests has kept pace with discovery
of methods for their violation." Barish, Scientific Proof and the Constitution,
31 TEMP. L. Q. 372 (1952).
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